When nobody can prove their own loyalty, the safest move is to prove someone else’s guilt.

Suppose you are a middle-school student in 1966, and a classmate stands up to denounce your teacher as bourgeois. You have nothing against the teacher. But if you stay silent, the next question is why you are protecting a class enemy, and the classmate who spoke first already looks more loyal than you. So you shout too. Within weeks the whole class has learned the move, and soon rival factions, each swearing it loves Mao most, are fighting one another.

Why would people who agreed on everything that seemed to matter (Mao, the revolution, the enemy) tear each other apart? The usual explanations are true but incomplete: Mao’s power struggle, elite factional politics, youth mobilization, institutional collapse, class categories and ideological extremism all mattered. Girard’s mimetic theory explains a different part: why the thing became contagious.

A game with no rules

Mao made everyone play a game called Who Is the Most Red? The prize was safety, status, belonging, moral innocence and proximity to the sacred model. The problem was that nobody knew the rules. “Being red” is the perfect mimetic object: infinite, invisible and zero-sum. You can always be more revolutionary, and if someone else appears more revolutionary than you, your own status becomes suspect. The scarce good was not food or land. It was revolutionary being.

That changes what an accusation is. In an ordinary conflict, accusation says: he did something wrong. In a purity crisis it says: I am safe because he is guilty. Accusation becomes immunizing, and failing to accuse can itself look counterrevolutionary. The student shouting at the teacher is not acting mainly on hatred. The attack is proof of belonging. The bowed head, placard, inked face and forced confession of the struggle session gave the crowd a body on which to see its own righteousness. A purity system without an external test will eventually use cruelty as the test.

Red against red

So the factions that fought were rarely red against anti-red. Both sides claimed to be the truest Maoists and borrowed the same sacred vocabulary, symbols and permission for righteous violence. They became what Girard calls doubles: imitator vs imitator, each accusing the other of false imitation. When everyone can perform the approved language, escalation is the only way left to tell true belief from counterfeit.

That threatened the Party itself. Once students, workers, local cadres, military units and Red Guard factions all claimed direct access to Maoist legitimacy, the hierarchy lost its monopoly on deciding who counted as legitimate. A state can tolerate hatred. It cannot tolerate unauthorized priesthoods. The center restored order by demobilizing the forces it had empowered, and Andrew Walder’s research shows that the larger share of casualties came not from rebel violence alone but from the organized repression used to restore order. After Mao died, the Gang of Four were made to carry more than their share of the whole system’s guilt, so that Mao’s sacred residue and the Party’s legitimacy could survive.

In Girard’s terms, then, the Cultural Revolution was a mimetic purity cascade: Mao became the sacred model, revolutionary authenticity became the desired object, everyone competed to prove redness by exposing impurity, accusation became self-defense, factions became doubles, and the state eventually restored order by re-monopolizing scapegoating. The lesson the Party drew was not “purity politics is bad.” It was that purity politics must never become horizontally self-authorizing. The Party learned that the most dangerous crowd is not an anti-Party crowd. It is a crowd that believes it can interpret sacred legitimacy directly.

Licensed scapegoating

Modern China is built around that lesson. It does not eliminate scapegoating. It centralizes, bureaucratizes, censors and redirects it, so that accusation never again becomes autonomous mob violence. The 2021 historical resolution repeatedly stresses centralized Party authority and unity. The Patriotic Education Law fuses love of country, Party and socialism into one object of loyalty. The stability-maintenance state tries to detect contention before it becomes self-amplifying. The rule for the classroom has changed:

You may imitate patriotic feeling. You may imitate loyalty. You may imitate outrage against approved enemies. But you may not decide the enemy yourself.

Resentment still needs somewhere to go, so the state supplies containers. Corrupt officials, tycoons and disloyal cadres absorb anger while the center keeps its legitimacy; corruption is real, but anti-corruption also works because opposing it is indistinguishable from defending corruption. Japan, the United States and “Western hostile forces” give resentment an outside object. Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kong dissidents, rights lawyers and underground religious groups can be placed outside the protected symbolic center while remaining inside the border. And the reform era added one container that was not a scapegoat at all: growth. People could compete over income, exams and housing instead of purity, which is still mimetic but far less explosively sacrificial. Do not fight your teacher to prove revolutionary purity. Pass the exam. Move to Shenzhen. Buy an apartment.

When growth slows

That last container is also the fragile one. When growth slows, property wealth stagnates and youth mobility declines, more desires become zero-sum again. The Party’s answer is not Cultural Revolution 2.0 but more discipline, censorship, nationalism, security and anti-corruption. Freedom House’s China Dissent Monitor shows that protest still occurs regularly and across regions; the difference is that the Party is extremely skilled at killing network effects early. Modern China is stable not because it is morally healed, but because it is procedurally optimized against uncontrolled mimetic contagion.

The Cultural Revolution asked, “who is the most red?” Modern China answers, “the Party decides what red means.” Whether that answer holds when there are fewer apartments and exam places left to compete over is the question the whole system was built to avoid asking.

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